

**Residential Mortgage
Mexico
Special Report****Mexican RMBS Performance
Update****Analysts**

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Related Research

- *2010 Latin American Structured Finance Review and Outlook, Feb. 9, 2010*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Update, Sept. 18, 2009*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Update, June 23, 2009*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Quarterly Report, March 9, 2009*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Quarterly Report, Nov. 10, 2008*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Quarterly Report, Sept. 2, 2008*
- *Mexican RMBS Performance Quarterly Report, May 13, 2008*
- *Introducing Rating Outlooks for Latin American Structured Finance Bonds, Jan. 6, 2009*

Summary

The economic slowdown in Mexico during 2009 negatively impacted the performance of Mexican residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Delinquency levels rose across most transactions in Fitch Ratings' portfolio, especially Sofol UDI-loans backed securities. Fitch attributes the increase in delinquencies during 2009 mostly to rising unemployment and decreasing available income resulting from under employment within the informal sector. In addition, it is apparent that weaker underwriting standards were employed in many of the more recent UDI-denominated RMBS transactions originated by Sofoles.

Fitch expects a continued increase in delinquencies throughout 2010 within most of the UDI-denominated transactions originated by Sofoles. A rebound in the economy and employment, an increase in collections efforts, and a successful loan modification program on selected loans would allow for the potential for stabilization during the second half of 2010. Peso-denominated loans and certain bank-originated transactions will continue to outperform UDI-denominated loans, as these loans were originated with higher underwriting standards and were directed mostly to higher-income individuals with stronger job stability.

Loan modification programs and increased collections efforts will be a key component for stabilization in RMBS delinquencies; therefore, servicers will face challenges during 2010. It is expected that some servicers, such as Crédito y Casa, will be replaced in certain transactions. Fitch will monitor closely the performance of the assets during the transition period, as this mechanism has not yet been tested within the Mexican RMBS market.

During 2009, Fitch's Mexican RMBS portfolio experienced 27 negative rating actions on 23 different tranches. Additionally, in February 2010 Fitch downgraded the ratings of 10 tranches and reaffirmed two ratings. All of these tranches were related to transactions backed by UDI mortgages originated by Sofoles/Sofomes. The tranches most impacted in Fitch's portfolio are subordinated notes backed by pools that do not have mortgage insurance, as the respective senior tranches were fully wrapped by financial guarantors. Fitch anticipates further negative rating actions on transactions that have experienced a significant deterioration in credit enhancement due to asset performance, particularly those serviced by financial entities with below-average servicer ratings. Despite the expectation of a continued increase in delinquencies, Fitch believes the capital structures for many of the transactions remain in line with the current ratings.

Infonavit-related RMBS (Cedevis) delinquencies remain in line with Fitch's expectations. Due to the 12-month automatic loan extension inherent to Infonavit loans following borrower unemployment, these transactions require a different approach in terms of analyzing delinquencies/losses. Extensions have increased substantially since the second half of 2008, and while they showed a slight decrease in August 2009, they started to increase again during the last four months of the year. Fitch expects extensions to begin a downward trend in coming months, as the 12-month grace period ends for employees that lost their jobs in the beginning of 2009. However, this could also cause an uptick in delinquencies during 2010. All Cedevis (Infonavit sponsored) RMBS tranches rated by Fitch

were assigned a Stable Rating Outlook during 2009. Despite the fact that delinquencies could grow during 2010 due to migration from extensions, Fitch believes the total credit enhancement available for Cedevis, ranging from 21% to 40%, supports current ratings.

Recent Rating Actions by Fitch

Action	Transaction Name	Current Rating	Previous Rating
Downgraded	MXMACFW 076U	BB-(mex) RON	BBB(mex) RWN
Downgraded	MXMACFW 074U	BBB(mex) RON	A-(mex)RWN
Downgraded	MXMACFW 072U	BBB+(mex) RON	A-(mex)RWN
Downgraded	MXMACFW 07U	A(mex) RON	A+(mex) RWN
Downgraded	MXMACCB 06U	AA(mex) RWN	AA+(mex) RWN
Affirmed	MXMACCB 05U	AAA(mex) RON	AAA(mex) RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB 084U	AA(mex) RON	AAA(mex) RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB 085U	AA(mex) RON	AAA(mex) RWN
Downgraded	Su Casita Trust Class A	BB+/AA-(mex) RON	BBB-/AA(mex) RWN
Downgraded	Su Casita Trust Class B	A-(mex) RON	A+(mex) RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB073U	BB(mex) RON	BBB(mex) RON
Affirmed	BRHSCCB 05U	AAA(mex) RON	AAA(mex) RWN

RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative.

Similar to previous performance updates, this report summarizes the general performance of more than 80 tranches rated by Fitch; in addition, this update provides further analysis of Cedevis transactions issued from 2004 to the first half of 2008.

Rating Actions by Fitch during 2009

Action	Transaction Name	Current Rating	Previous Rating
Downgraded	MXMACFW06U	BB(mex) RON	BBB(mex) RWN
Downgraded	MXMACFW062U	B-(mex) RON	BB(mex) RWN
Downgraded	BRHSCCB 06U	AA+(mex)RON	AAA(mex)RWN
Downgraded	BRHSCCB 06-3U	AA+(mex)RON	AAA(mex)RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB073U	BBB(mex)RON	A(mex)RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB 08U	AA(mex)RON	AAA(mex)RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB 082U	AA(mex)RON	AAA(mex)RWN
Downgraded	BRHCCB 083U	A-(mex)RON	A(mex)RWN
Affirmed	Bonhito F8531	AAA(mex)	AAA(mex)
Affirmed	Bonhito F9531	AAA(mex)	AAA(mex)
Affirmed	Bonhito F5532	AAA(mex)	AAA(mex)
Affirmed	Bonhito F1026	AAA(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	MTROCB 07U	BBB-	BBB+
Downgraded	MTROCB 07U	AA-(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	MTROCB 08U	BBB-	BBB+
Downgraded	MTROCB 08U	AA-(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACCB 05-2U	AA+(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACCB 06U	AA+(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW 06U	BBB(mex)	A(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW 06-2U	BB(mex)	BBB+(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW 07U	A+(mex)	AA(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW 07-2U	A-(mex)	A(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW07-4U	A-(mex)	A(mex)
Downgraded	MXMACFW07-6U	BBB(mex)	A(mex)
Downgraded	BRHSCCB 06-2U	A-(mex)	A+(mex)
Downgraded	BRHSCCB 06-4U	A-(mex)	A+(mex)
Downgraded	CREYCCB 06U	AA+(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	CREYCB 06-2U	A-(mex)	A+(mex)
Downgraded	CREYCB 06U	AA-(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	DBCB 07U	AA-(mex)	AAA(mex)
Downgraded	DBCB 07-2U	AA-(mex)	AAA(mex)

RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative.

Macroeconomic Conditions Have Had an Impact in Mexico

Sovereign Rating



Fitch expects 2009 Mexican GDP numbers to close at a 7.2% decrease relative to the previous year. The strong correlation of the Mexican economy to that of the U.S. and the outbreak of H1N1 influenza caused a general decrease in consumption and investment, especially in border states and tourist regions. As a result, the Mexican economy was among the most affected by the global financial crisis. Also contributing to the sovereign's fiscal weakness was falling oil production, a major revenue base for the sovereign's budget. The deterioration of the sovereign's fiscal condition, among other issues, led Fitch to downgrade Mexico's foreign currency IDR to 'BBB' from 'BBB+' and its local currency IDR to 'BBB+' from 'A-' in November 2009.

From December 2008 to December 2009, the number of formal workers affiliated with the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) decreased by 1.2%, with permanent workers being the most affected with a decrease of 2%. While employment information related to the informal employment sector is difficult to track, given that these workers are typically not contractually affiliated with an employer or registered with any fiscal authorities, Fitch believes this sector was impacted even more significantly than the formal sector. This can be seen in the rising delinquency levels within certain RMBS transactions originated by nonbank financial institutions (Sofoles/Sofomes) that provide financing to those employed by the informal sector.

Some macroeconomic recovery is evident from recent high-frequency data, and Fitch expects Mexico's real GDP to slowly recover and grow by 3.0% in 2010. However, recent legislation increasing value-added and income taxes, along with increases in fuel prices, could outweigh 2010's minimum wage increase of 4.85% and hinder investment and employment, thereby increasing pressure in income and consumption throughout the year.

Public Housing Funds Maintained RMBS Issuance levels

During 2009, RMBS issuance levels remained somewhat stable, although the profile of the issuers changed significantly away from SOFOLES and banks to new entrants like Fovissste. Only one traditional RMBS was sponsored by banks and Sofoles/Sofomes, Bacomb09&09-2&09-3. Sofoles were able to issue through Hito's platform during the first quarter of 2009.



Public housing funds dominated RMBS issuance during 2009, with Infonavit issuing USD860 million in Cedevis plus more than USD240 million through Hito's platform, whereas Fovissste made its debut in the RMBS market this year with three TFOVIS transactions accounting for more than USD926 million and one transaction through Hito equivalent to USD222 million. Fitch expects housing funds to maintain issuance leadership this year.

Drivers of Collateral Performance — Portfolio Analysis

Fitch defines defaults as situations in which arrears are more than 180 days or when seven or more payments are not made. The charts below show the overall performance of this metric for various RMBS transactions originated by Sofoles, banks, Infonavit and Fovissste for the past several years. In addition, the appendix on pages 28–30 includes charts for various transactions showing 90 days or more delinquencies, which provide a good early warning mechanism for future performance. All of this data reflect the servicing and trustee reports provided to Fitch as of Dec. 31, 2009, and in transactions issued by Infonavit as of Jan. 31, 2010. It is important to note that the delinquency information provided in these charts is on a dynamic basis, and the denominator is declining due to amortizations and, more importantly, prepayments. When comparing these levels to the original static loss numbers, the delinquency rates are overstated to some degree.

Sofoles vs. Banks

Collateral performance has been affected by the adverse macroeconomic environment. However, there are significant differences in the performance of pools securitized by Sofoles and those securitized by banks. Borrower profiles differ, as bank borrowers belong to middle- to high-income segments (average monthly income from MXP60,000–MXP120,000) and work in the formal sector, while Sofoles borrowers belong to low- to middle-income segments (average monthly income from MXP10,000–MXP40,000), and employment concentrations in the informal economy can account for up to 35% of the pool. The difference in performance is in line with Fitch's expectations that low-income borrowers are more vulnerable to a stressed economic environment.

Delinquencies above 180 days over outstanding balance rose from 3.99% at the end of 2008 to 11.08% at the end of 2009 for Sofol/Sofom-sponsored RMBS, whereas bank-sponsored RMBS delinquencies increased from 1.17% to 4.03% in the same timeframe.

Peso vs. UDI

Another trend that can be observed is that the performance of UDI-denominated loans has been worse than that of peso-denominated loans. UDI loans are characterized by monthly payments denominated in minimum wages. This means payments increase annually as opposed to peso-denominated loans, which, in most cases, either remain fixed or get a reduction due to timely payment. It should be highlighted that the majority of peso-denominated pools have been originated by banks, but this trend can be observed even when comparing peso pools versus UDI pools securitized by several Sofoles.

This difference in performance is in line with Fitch's original default expectations for each type of currency loan, as Fitch's analysis indicates the default rates for peso transactions will be lower for two specific reasons. In a base case scenario, these loans will perform better because they are targeted at higher-income individuals. In a stress case scenario, Fitch's analysis estimates the borrowers' capacity to make payments on a peso loan will be better than an inflation-linked loan or minimum wage loan because the debt service will not increase (*see charts in the appendix on pages 28 – 30*). SHF's

minimum wage–UDI swap mitigates the risk of mismatches between the increase in the minimum wage and inflation; however, the borrowers' payments for UDI loans most likely increase on an annual basis.

Another cause that could explain the different performance between peso loans and UDI loans is the LTV evolution during the life of the loan through scenarios of low and high inflation. In a base case scenario, in which property prices increase at the same pace as inflation or even above inflation, LTV decreases for both types of loans, increasing the borrower's willingness to pay. On the other hand, scenarios of high inflation may cause the outstanding balance of UDI loans to increase above property prices, pressuring the borrower's equity; however, during the same high inflation scenario, a peso loan balance cannot increase. Therefore, LTV decreases under both scenarios for the peso loan.

Delinquencies above 180 days over outstanding balance rose from 4.61% at the end of 2008 to 12.57% at the end of 2009 for UDI-denominated pools, whereas peso-denominated pools delinquencies increased from 1.24% to 4.06% in the same timeframe. This magnitude in performance difference was greater than anticipated. The previously mentioned loan attributes can only explain some of the performance difference, as it is apparent that aggressive underwriting associated with UDI loans was widespread among the Sofoles. It should be noted that even peso-denominated loans experienced a drastic delinquency increase on a relative basis. This can be partially attributed to the lower seasoning of these loans, as most of peso-denominated RMBS were issued during 2007 and 2008.


Early Vintages

Regarding Sofoles pools, there continue to be signs that the earlier vintages of 2004 and 2005 continue to perform better than those of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Some of this may be due to a deterioration in credit quality of the borrowers, but the difference in seasoning for the earlier transactions is an important contributing factor as well. Many of the 2004 and 2005 vintages had a minimum seasoning of two years prior to the transaction closing, and some were as long as four years. This compares to the 2006, 2007, and 2008 transactions, which contained loans that were typically seasoned between one and two years at closing (*for more information, see the appendix, pages 28–30*). However, older loans have also come under pressure due to unemployment and a decrease in available income.


Delinquencies above 180 days over outstanding balance rose from 5.58% at the end of 2008 to 10.73% at the end of 2009 for Sofol/Sofom transactions issued 2004–2005, whereas Sofol/Sofom 2006–2008 RMBS delinquencies increased from 3.89% to 11.09% in the same timeframe.

In addition to general increases in delinquencies caused by mounting economic pressures, the transactions that are performing worse than average have specific characteristics that need to be highlighted. Some of these characteristics include concentrations in certain states, problem projects related to a few specific developers, greater concentrations in the informal sector, certain developer-originated loans, and poor servicing.


Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) SOFOLES Issued 2004, 2005, and 2006



Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) SOFOLES Issued 2007 and 2008



Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) Banks



Loan Modification Programs

In May 2009, RMBS servicers started to request investor’s assemblies to introduce the various mortgage restructuring initiatives sponsored by the Asociación Hipotecaria Mexicana (AHM). The framework consists of four different alternatives: deferred payments; temporary payment discounts; permanent payment discounts; and judicial agreements. These products could potentially alleviate concerns over the borrowers’ current debt service burden, thus allowing them to continue to make payments on their homes.


According to the original modification program, a restructured loan needs to demonstrate sustained payment for three consecutive months after the loan’s original conditions are modified in order to be classified as a performing loan. Despite this classification, restructured loans will be included in OC formulas after 12 months of sustained payment, thus mitigating the risk of distributing cash flow to the residual holder as a consequence of modifying a significant number of loans.

In February 2010, Fitch detected that OC calculations were including modified loan balances in Su Casita’s RMBS, thus distorting actual OC levels. It must be highlighted that only one transaction distributed flows to the residual holder. According to the servicer, this situation was presented specifically in loans in which the borrower came performing before the loan was modified. Although this practice was not intentional, integrating the stipulated accounting rules challenges servicers’ reporting capabilities. Proper accounting and reporting of modified loan balances are of great importance, as cash flow distributions and other structural features such as disbursements from partial credit guarantees are determined by the performing pool balance. For more information, see Fitch Research on “Fitch Ratings: Clasificación de productos de solución como créditos vigentes en bursatilizaciones hipotecarias de Su Casita,” dated Feb.12, 2010, available on Fitch’s Web site at www.fitchratings.com.

Prepayment



As mentioned in the most recent RMBS Performance Update, one of the main credit enhancements within Mexican RMBS transactions is excess spread, which covers a significant percentage of the expected losses a portfolio may face. Under high prepayment scenarios, excess spread would decrease, causing less coverage on future losses.

Constant Prepayment Rate (%) — SOFOLES Issued 2004, 2005, and 2006



Source: Fitch Ratings.

Due to the current adverse macroeconomic conditions, Fitch has noticed that average prepayments for the past six months have declined. This trend is more significant in transactions denominated in UDIs than the ones denominated in pesos, and it can be attributed to lower disposable income from borrowers.




Infonavit — Migration Analysis

After several months of significant deterioration in collateral performance, extensions in Cedevis pools have shown signs of stabilization or in some cases decline. This might be partially explained by the fact that the 12-month extension period expired during the first half of 2009 for some borrowers who had not been able to make payments afterwards. This most likely accounted for the rise in 180+ days delinquencies during the last quarter of 2009 and January 2010. On the other hand, the percentage of borrowers who started a bimonthly period in the extension status and ended the period in the current status has increased since the second half of 2009.


One of the main risks associated with Infonavit loans' performance is unemployment in the formal sector of the economy, which experienced significant growth in the last

months of 2008 and in 2009. The ability of the borrower who loses a job to obtain a new job in the formal economy mitigates potential increases in delinquencies in Cedevis pools. Fitch conducted a migration analysis, based on loan-by-loan information provided by ACFIN, in order to quantify the effect of layoffs that took place during 2009. The analysis provided the following insights:

- The number of new extensions has stabilized since June 2009. From the end of October 2008 to the beginning of June 2009, 2.6% of performing loans migrated to the extension status every bimonthly period. From the end of June 2009 through the end of the year, 2.18% of performing loans migrated to extension.
- The number of loans that migrated from extension to any delinquency bucket peaked from December 2008 to April 2009. During the last few months of the year, despite the fact that this percentage decreased significantly when compared to the aforementioned period, migration increased. From April 2009–June 2009, 0.54% of loans in extension migrated to delinquency buckets, compared to 1.06% from October 2009–December 2009.
- The number of borrowers who were able to end their extensions and become current has increased since August 2009. From October 2009–December 2009, 33.1% of the loans that started in extension status ended the period as current.
- Borrowers who have been able to cure, i.e. become performing after being non-performing, has increased since June 2009, but not at the same levels observed during 2008. This migration can be attributed to successful social collection programs implemented by Infonavit.
- Borrowers who stay in the REA regime (direct deduction is not in place, as the borrower does not have a job in the formal sector of the economy) for more than eight months, i.e. four bimonthly periods, are likely to default on their mortgages. Only 12.1% of the borrowers who stayed in REA for more than four bimonthly periods were able to stay current on their payments.
- The most affected economies were those linked to the U.S., such as northern states and states with a strong touristic profile. The negative impact provoked significant increases in delinquency as well as extensions during 2009.




Roll Rates – Extensions




Source: Fitch Ratings with data retrieved from ACFIN.

Roll Rates — Nonperforming Loans More Than 90 Days in Arrears



Source: Fitch Ratings with data retrieved from ACFIN.

Current Percentage After Entering REA



Source: Fitch Ratings with data retrieved from ACFIN.

Delinquencies and Extensions by State

(%)

	As of Dec. 31, 2008		As of Dec. 31, 2009	
	Delinquency +180	Extension	Delinquency +180	Extension
	Days		Days	
Aguascalientes	1.06	4.94	4.24	6.28
Baja California	1.34	4.92	4.89	7.62
Baja California Sur	0.42	4.12	2.80	4.78
Campeche	0.35	5.88	3.67	5.23
Chiapas	1.97	5.06	7.46	5.31
Chihuahua	1.39	6.21	4.90	9.40
Coahuila	1.45	5.28	5.02	7.88
Colima	0.57	3.70	3.13	5.01
Distrito Federal	1.50	4.54	5.26	5.16
Durango	1.63	3.97	4.28	7.93
Guanajuato	0.76	4.82	3.72	5.78
Hidalgo	0.43	4.34	3.38	5.67
Jalisco	0.68	3.39	2.65	4.36
México	0.87	4.03	3.77	5.59
Michoacán	0.55	3.39	3.59	5.48
Nayarit	0.26	3.75	3.59	5.48
Nuevo León	0.47	3.33	2.56	5.30
Oaxaca	1.99	2.58	5.39	3.79
Puebla	1.41	4.18	4.51	6.04
Querétaro	0.98	3.61	3.48	4.52
Quintana Roo	0.23	4.38	2.73	7.95
San Luis Potosi	0.49	3.78	3.04	6.35
Sinaloa	1.03	4.88	4.02	6.41
Sonora	1.08	5.19	4.48	8.34
Tabasco	1.81	6.85	8.56	5.33
Tamaulipas	1.24	5.09	4.39	7.83
Veracruz	1.11	4.41	4.36	5.39
Zacatecas	0.00	3.35	6.19	3.77


GMAC

GMAC

Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Performance			
			WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
MXMACCB05U	8/4/05	0.8%–3%, IFC GPO 10.6%, SHF GPI 25%	85	48	NL, EM, BCN	75.89	15.17	12.04	AAA(mex) RON
MXMACCB052U	10/20/05	0.8%–3%, IFC GPO 7%, SHF GPI 25%	83	48	DF, BCN, EM	113.49	19.70	14.54	AA+(mex) RWN
MXMACCB06U	3/30/06	0.8%–3%, IFC GPO 10.95%, SHF GPI 25%	73	43	DF, QTO, NL	97.99	21.36	14.90	AA(mex) RWN
MXMACFW06U_062U	10/26/06	0.5%–1.5% FGIC GPO ^b 100%	86	15	BCN, EM, JAL	131.09	34.44	23.79	BB(mex) RON/ B–(mex) RON
MXMACFW07U_072U	3/23/07	1%–2% FGIC GPO ^b 100%	68	26	DF, NL, EM	201.43	19.50	13.99	A (mex) RON/ BBB+(mex) RON
MXMACFW 074U	7/27/07	1%–2% MBIA GPO ^b 100%	85	29	BCN, EM, QR	280.63	21.40	15.14	BBB(mex) RON
MXMACFW 076U	10/12/07	1.5%–2%, MBIA(mex) GPO ^b 100%	88	19	BCN, EM, QR	150.32	23.29	15.48	BB–(mex) RON

^aMillions of UDIs. ^bFull wrap applies to senior notes. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative.
Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)




Source: Fitch Ratings.

During December 2009 and February 2010, Fitch took rating actions on nine of GMAC’s RMBS. These actions were based on a detailed analysis, which included a review of monthly surveillance data as well as a re-evaluation of delinquency and loss assumptions and a break-even scenario obtained by re-running Fitch’s cash flow model. The re-running of the cash flow model determines the maximum level of defaults each structure could sustain without suffering a loss. These results were compared to Fitch’s new delinquency and loss numbers assumed for each portfolio and at each given rating category. The cash flow model incorporates all credit enhancements for each issuance as well as their structural characteristics, like the waterfall of payments described in the legal documents. The cash flow model also incorporates Fitch’s analysis of CPR, delayed proceeds due to delinquencies, excess spread, mortgage insurance, and Fitch’s view on the recovery proceeds of any houses yet to be sold within the trust.

This full analysis was done for transactions MXMACCB05U, MXMACCB052U, MXMACCB06U, MXMACFW06U_062U, MXMACFW07U_072U, MXMACFW074U and MXMACFW076U. The rating of the transaction MXMACCB05U 'AA+(mex)' was affirmed and placed on Rating Outlook Negative, while the rating of transaction MXMACCB052U, 'AA+(mex)' was maintained on Rating Watch Negative. The MXMACCB06U transaction was downgraded one notch to 'A(mex)' from 'A+(mex)'. The rating of the senior bond MXMACFW06U was downgraded to 'BB(mex)' from 'BBB(mex)', and the mezzanine bond MXMACFW062U was downgraded to 'B-(mex)' from 'BB(mex)'. The senior notes of transaction MXMACFW07U_072U were downgraded to 'A(mex)' from 'A+(mex)' and the mezzanine tranche to 'BBB+(mex)' from 'A-(mex)'. MXMACFW074U, a subordinated tranche, was downgraded to 'BBB(mex)' from 'A-(mex)', and the most recent transaction's mezzanine bond, MXMACFW076U, was downgraded to 'BB-(mex)' from 'BBB(mex)'. For further information, see Fitch Research on "Fitch Ratings modifica a la baja las calificaciones de dos bonos respaldados por hipotecas de GMAC," dated Dec. 16, 2009, and "Fitch Ratings toma acciones de calificación sobre siete bonos respaldados por hipotecas de GMAC" dated Feb.12, 2010, available on Fitch's Web site at www.fitchratings.com.

The performance of MXMACFW 06U_062U continues to deteriorate, at a faster pace than the rest of the transactions issued by GMAC. The 180 days or more delinquencies of MXMACFW06U_062U increased to 23.79% at Dec. 31, 2009 from 17.51% at July 31, 2009. This high level of delinquencies has translated into a negative 55.08% OC with the coupon payment of Jan. 25, 2010. During the same period, from July to December, the transaction MXMACCB075U_076U continued with the increasing trend in delinquencies. The 180 days or more delinquencies for this transaction increased to 15.48% from 10.29%, and the average CPR for the past three months was 4.94%.




Su Casita

Su Casita

Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Performance			
			WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
BRHSCCB05U	9/30/05	1.5%–3%, SHF GPO 10.6%, GPI 25%	83	16	DF, NL, EM	116.95	18.15	9.61	AAA(mex) RON
BRHSCCB06	4/17/06	2.25%–5%, IFC GPO 12%, SHF GPI 25%	73	17	DF, QTO, NL	72.43	12.16	5.73	AAA(mex) ROS
BRHSCCB062_063	11/15/06	1%–3.4%, Genworth GPI 20%	74	15	DF, EM, NL	106.37	7.38	4.71	AAA(mex) ROS/A(mex) ROS
BRHSCCB06U_062U	6/9/06	1%–3.8%, SHF GPI 25%	80	48	DF, EM, QR	192.13	17.44	10.86	AA+(mex) RON/A–(mex) RON
BRHSCCB063U_064U	8/4/06	1%–3.2%, Genworth GPI 25%	82	38	BCN, DF, QR	182.23	20.98	14.21	AA+(mex) RON/A–(mex) RON
BRHSCCB07_072	1/26/07	0.7%–3.4% Genworth GPI 20%, SHF GPI 25%	76	10	DF, NL, EM	143.37	7.11	3.70	AAA(mex) ROS/A(mex) ROS
BRHCCB073U	10/25/07	1%–2.8%, MBIA (mex) GPO ^b 100%	77	15	BCN, EM, QR	653.64	22.42	10.84	BB(mex) RON
BRHCCB07_072_073	12/21/07	1.75%–4%, Genworth GPI 25%, SHF GPI 25%	75	13	EM, DF, GRO	340.63	6.25	3.49	AAA(mex) ROS/AAA (mex) ROS/A(mex) ROS
BRHCCB 08U_082U_083U	4/17/08	1.9%–3.8, Genworth 30%, SHF 30%	76	20	BCN, QR, JAL	412.30	16.63	7.29	AA (mex) RON/AA(mex) RON/A–(mex) RON
Su Casita Trust	4/2/07	1%–2%, MBIA ^b	86	26	BCN, CHI, EM	534.14	14.94	7.55	BB+, AA–(mex) RON/A–(mex) RON
BRHCCB 084U_085U	12/2/08	4.40%–4.80%, Genworth 30%, SHF 30%, FMO 15%	84	16	BCN, EM, QR	386.56	11.82	3.68	AA(mex) RON/AA(mex) RON


^aMillions of UDIs. ^bFull wrap applies to senior notes. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)



In February 2010, Fitch conducted the analysis previously described for four of the 11 transactions of Su Casita that are rated by Fitch. The transactions that were analyzed were BRHSCCB05U, BRHCCB073U, Su Casita Trust, and BRHCCB084U_085U. The rating of the senior bond BRHSCCB05U 'AAA(mnex)' was affirmed, while the mezzanine bond BRHCCB073U was downgraded three notches to 'BB(mex)' from 'BBB(mex)'. Su Casita trust class A was downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' international scale and to 'AA-(mex)' from 'AA(mex)' local scale. The class B bond of this transaction was downgraded to 'A-(mex)' from 'A+(mex)'. The bond BRHCCB084U was downgraded to 'AA(mex)' from 'AAA(mex)' and the tranche BRHCCB085U to 'AA(mex)' from 'AAA(mex)'.

The macroeconomic environment has had an impact on Su Casita transactions, and it can be observed in the collateral performance of the 11 transactions rated by Fitch. This impact has resulted in an increase in delinquencies levels, even though all transactions issued by Su Casita have deteriorated. BRHSCCB 06U_062U and BRHSCCB 063U_064U stand out in terms of poor collateral performance. The 180 days or more delinquencies of BRHSCCB 06U_062U increased to 10.86% as of Dec. 31, 2009 from 8.41% at July 31, 2009, while for BRHSCCB063U_04U the 180 days or more delinquencies increased to 14.21% from 10.55% during the same period. Another transaction closely watched by Fitch is BRHCCB084U_085U; the 180 days or more delinquencies of this transaction rose to 3.68% at Dec. 31, 2009, from 1.00% at the end of July 2009. This transaction started with a total credit enhancement of 19.4%, provided by 15% of a financial guarantee and 4.4% of OC. As of the January 2010 coupon payment, Su Casita had disposed 6.89% of the credit enhancement given by the guarantee, maintaining an OC of 0.00% during the past five months.



As previously mentioned in this report, Su Casita has been modifying loans in several transactions. Despite the fact that the original modification program established that a modified loan would need to demonstrate sustained payment during 12 months to be taken into account for OC calculation, some modified mortgage loans were considered as current loans and included in the OC calculation. It must be highlighted that only one transaction, BRHSCCB 06-2 & 06-3, distributed flows to the residual holder.

As of Dec. 31, 2009, the percentages of modified loans over the outstanding balance for each transaction were: BRHSCCB 05U, 3.20%; BRHSCCB 06U_062U, 2.93%; BRHSCCB


06_062, 4.48%; BRHSCCB 063U_064U, 4.32%; BRHSCCB 07_072, 3.64%; BRHCCB07_072_073, 4.45%; BRHCCB 08U_082U_083U, 4.57%; and BRHCCB 084U_085U, 3.46%. For more information, see Fitch Research on "Fitch Ratings modifica a la baja las calificaciones de cinco bonos respaldados por créditos hipotecarios originados por Su Casita," dated Feb. 12, 2010 and "Fitch Ratings: Clasificación de productos solución como créditos vigentes en bursatilizaciones hipotecarias de Su Casita," dated Feb.12, 2010, available on Fitch's Web site at www.fitchratings.com.

Metrofinanciera

Metrofinanciera


Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Performance			
			WA OLVTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
METROCB04U	12/16/04	1.5%–3%, SHF GPO 9%, GPI 25%	83	28.0	JAL, BCN, TAM	56.93	5.42	3.67	AAA(mex) RON
METROCB06U	6/2/06	1.5%–3%, SHF GPO 11%, GPI 25%	86	25.9	JAL, BCN, TAM	83.48	13.10	9.75	AAA(mex) RWN
MTROCB07U	6/4/07	2.5%–9.5%, SHF GPI, Genworth SC	88	18.6	BCN, JAL, GTO	229.24	15.31	11.63	AA–(mex) RWN
MTROCB08U	2/15/08	4%–12%, GPI SHF, Genworth, United Guaranty 22.62%	87	23.0	JAL, BCN, GTO	231.44	11.38	8.63	AA–(mex) RWN
MTROFCB08	4/28/08	2.1%–3.15%, GPO SHF 30%, GPI Genworth/United 14.95%	72	12.0	JAL, DF, GTO	148.16	7.23	5.67	AAA(mex) RWN

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLVTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON - Rating Outlook Negative. Source: Fitch Ratings.



Metrofinanciera transactions issued in 2007 and 2008 have continued to show an increase in 180 days or more delinquencies, most notably for transactions METROCB07U and METROCB08U. As of Dec. 31, 2009, the 180 day or more delinquencies of METROCB08U increased to 8.63% from 5.83% at July 31, 2009. During the same period, 180 days or more delinquencies of METROCB07U rose to 11.63% from 9.11%. It is important to note that the METROCB06U and METROCB04U transactions have both shown recent signs of deterioration, with delinquencies almost doubling to 9.75% and 3.67%, respectively, over the past six months. Fitch will continue to closely monitor performance, as delinquencies in most portfolios have yet to show signs of stabilization.

CPR in Metrofinanciera’s transactions has been higher for the two older transactions. METROCB 04U had an average CPR of 9.33% in the past three months, while METROCB 06U was 9.61%. The rest of Metrofinanciera’s transactions had a CPR average of less than 6.59% in the past three months.




Hipotecaria Crédito y Casa

Hipotecaria Crédito y Casa

Deal Name	Closing Information					Current Performance			
	Closing Date	Initial CE	WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		
							90+	180+	Current Rating
CREYCCB 06U	5/22/06	1.5%–3%, SHF GPO 9.6%, GPI 25%	85	54.00	BCN, EM, JAL	108.32	18.78	12.18	AA+(mex) RON
CREYCB 06U_062U	12/13/06	1.5%–4.7%, SHF GPI 24.9%	82	41.56	BCN, JAL, BCS	850.17	26.58	18.72	AA–(mex) RON/ A–(mex) RON

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative. Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)




Source: Fitch Ratings.

The contraction of the credit markets, deterioration of assets, and a lack of support from Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF) caused Crédito y Casa to default on its unsecured obligations during 2009. Crédito y Casa’s servicing platform has been recently acquired by ABC Capital. At the writing of this report, Crédito y Casa was continuing to service these two transactions.

The 180 days or more delinquencies for Hipotecaria Crédito y Casa transactions continue to increase. At Dec. 31, 2009 the 180 days or more delinquencies of CREYCCB06U increased to 12.18% from 7.81% on July 31, 2009, while the 90 days or more delinquencies increased to 18.78% from 13.52% over the same period, and the CPR average for the past three months was 7.14%. This transaction features a 9.60% partial guarantee, and since the May 2009 coupon payment almost 6.4 million UDIs of this guarantee have been disbursed.

CREYCB06U_062U’s 90 days or more delinquencies reached 26.58% from 21.35% over the past six months. Delinquencies of 180 days or more increased to 18.72% from 13.42%, keeping a CPR average of 5.32% over the past three months.




Fincasa

Fincasa

Closing Information						Current Performance			
Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial C/E	WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		
							90+	180+	Current Rating
FCASACB06U	10/12/06	1.5%–3%, SHF GPO 12.5%, GPI 25%	86	47	BCN, EM, CHIS	92.99	10.89	8.29	AAA(mex) RON

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. C/E – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RON – Rating Outlook Negative.
Source: Fitch Ratings.


Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)



Source: Fitch Ratings.

FCASACB06U, the only RMBS placed by Fincasa, has performed better than average in comparison to other UDI-denominated Sofol-issued transactions. Despite the good performance, this transaction continued to experience an increase during the past year in 180 days or more delinquencies, as can be seen in the chart above. As of Dec. 31, 2009, 180 days or more delinquencies rose to 8.29% from 5.77% at the end of July 2009, while 90 days or more delinquencies rose to 10.89% from 8.16% during the same period. The CPR has been at an average of 8.03% in the past three months.

Constant Prepayment Rate



Source: Fitch Ratings.


Patrimonio

Patrimonio

Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Performance			
			WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
							90+	180+	
PATRICB06U	12/5/06	1.65%–5.2%, AMBAC GPO ^b	80	49.0	NL, EM, BCN	170.05	12.00	10.10	NR
PATRICB07U	6/21/07	2%–5.2%, AMBAC GPO ^b	81	38.2	EM, NL, BCN	165.43	14.88	11.60	NR
PATRICB 072	7/2/07	1%–3.75%, AMBAC GPO ^b	63	20.0	NL, JAL, EM	195.76	4.64	3.36	A(mex) ROS


^aMillions of UDIs. ^bFull wrap applies to senior notes. NR – Not rated. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)



Out of the three transactions that Patrimonio has in the market, Fitch rates the mezzanine piece of the peso-denominated transaction PATRICB 07_072. The CPR has averaged 7.29% during the past three months. Despite the macroeconomic environment, this transaction have shown consistency, keeping moderate delinquency levels. At Dec. 31, 2009, the 180 days or more delinquencies were 3.36%.

Constant Prepayment Rate




Banorte

Banorte

Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Collateral Balance ^a	Current Performance		
			WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States		Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
BNORCB06_062	12/18/06	1.0%–2.5%	43	30.5	NL, DF, JAL	270.76	90+ 9.03	180+ 7.58	AAA(mex) ROS/ A+(mex) ROS

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.


Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)



Source: Fitch Ratings.

Banorte’s transaction was the first bank-issued RMBS deal in the market; this transaction closed in December 2006. The prepayment rate average over the past three months was 10.58%, while the 180 days or more delinquencies increased to 7.58% at Dec. 31, 2009 from 5.07% at July 31, 2009. Delinquencies of 90 days or more increased to 9.03% from 7.42% over the same period. With the January 2010 coupon payment, this transaction reached an OC of 2.87%. Because its performance has shown signs of deterioration in recent months, Fitch will continue to closely monitor this transaction in the following months.

Constant Prepayment Rate




Source: Fitch Ratings.

BBVA Bancomer


BBVA Bancomer

Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	Closing Information			Current Performance			
			WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
BACOMCB07	12/21/07	3.9%–5.3%	68	26	DF, NL, EM	473.42	0.84	0.71	AAA(mex) ROS
BACOMCB08	3/14/08	3.5%–5.5%	68	25	JAL, DF, NL	213.16	0.86	0.73	AAA(mex) ROS
BACOMCB09_092_093	8/7/09	9.7%–11.2%	67	19	DF, JAL, NL	1,441.18	0.22	0.02	AAA(mex) ROS

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.



For BBVA Bancomer’s transactions, 180 days or more delinquencies remained under 0.73%, reaffirming Fitch’s position that peso-denominated and bank-issued transactions are performing better than UDI-denominated and Sofol-issued transactions (*for more information, see the appendix, pages 28–30*); Fitch attributes these low delinquency levels to high-quality borrowers and strong servicing. BBVA Bancomer transactions have had an average CPR over the past three months in the 6%–11% range.




HSBC


HSBC

Deal Name	Closing Information					Current Performance			
	Closing Date	Initial CE	WA OLVTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating
							90+	180+	
HSBCCB 07_072	3/30/07	1%–3.5%, Genworth GPI 9%	70	19	DF, EM, NL	416.14	7.11	5.50	AAA(mex) RON/ A(mex) RON
HSBCCB 073_074	10/5/07	1%–3.5%, SHF GPI 9%	72	17	DF, EM, NL	618.46	8.59	6.18	AAA(mex) RON/ A(mex) RON
HSBCCB 08_082	9/4/08	9.8%–10.20%, SHF GPI 16%, GPO 8.72%	80	21	DF, EM, JAL	326.06	3.11	1.64	AAA(mex) ROS/ AAA(mex) ROS

^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLVTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RON – Rating Outlook Negative. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable. Source: Fitch Ratings.



HSBC's transaction HSBCCB073_074 continues to perform more poorly than the rest of the bank-issued transactions. As of Jan. 25, 2010, this transaction reached an OC of negative 5.59%. As of Dec. 31, 2009, the 180 days or more delinquency levels of this transaction increased to 6.18% from 3.86% at the end of July 2009. Another transaction closely watched by Fitch is HSBCCB 07_072, which showed deterioration in OC during the first nine months of 2009; nonetheless, this trend changed in the last three months of the year, during which OC became positive. Average prepayments in the past three months have been stable in the 6%–8% range.




Scotiabank

Scotiabank

Closing Information						Current Performance			
Deal Name	Closing Date	Initial CE	WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		
							90+	180+	Current Rating
SCOTICB08	3/14/08	5.11%–6.3%	69	16	DF, NL, EM	484.35	3.86	2.74	AAA(mex) ROS


^aMillions of UDIs. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance)



Scotiabank’s transaction SCOTICB08 was issued at the end of 2008. The CPR average of this transaction over the past three months was 9.74%. As of Dec. 31, 2009, 180 days or more delinquencies had risen to 2.74%. The OC target of 6.30% was reached at March 31, 2009; however, it decreased slightly to 6.22% at September’s cutoff date but was reached again with the coupon payment of November and the following months.

Constant Prepayment Rate




Infonavit

Infonavit

Deal Name	Closing Date	Closing Information				Current Performance				
		Initial CE	WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)			Current Rating
							90 +	180+		
CEDEVIS04	3/19/04	18.00%	72	—	NL, EM, JAL	348	11.10	8.68	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS04U	11/12/04	23.00%	89	—	BCN, NL, JAL	1,278	9.97	7.76	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS05_2U	10/7/05	22.00%	86	—	NL, COA, GTO	1,133	6.80	4.83	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS06U	4/28/06	24.00%	89	—	NL, COA, CHIH	1,425	6.85	5.23	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS06_3U	10/13/06	20.00%	87	23	DF, EM, CHIH	1,763	5.83	4.23	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS07U	4/26/07	22.02%	88	19	NL, COA, CHIH	3,048	4.88	3.55	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS07_3U	10/1/07	19.00%	89	24	NL, CHIH, COA	2,843	3.91	2.74	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS08U_082U	4/11/08	21.18%	89	24	NL, CHIH, COA	3,927	2.43	1.45	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS083U_084U	6/12/08	23.50%	88	21	NL, COL, TAMPS	4,621	1.87	1.05	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS085U_086U	8/29/08	24.57%	88	22	NL, CHIH, TAMPS	2,694	1.61	0.88	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS087U_088U	10/24/08	30.40%	88	24	NL, CHIH, TAMPS	5,343	0.49	0.27	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS089U_0810U	12/23/08	29.41%	88	27	NL, CHIH, TAMPS	3,127	0.25	0.12	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS09U	5/22/09	28.30%	90	32	NL, CHIH, TAMPS	2,775	0.03	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS092U	6/7/09	27.25%	91	39	NL, EM, JAL	3,535	0.03	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS093U	8/25/09	27.25%	91	39	EM, NL, JAL	2,075	0.01	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS094U	10/01/09	28.35%	89	22	NL, JAL, TAMPS	3,584	0.01	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	
CEDEVIS095U	11/23/09	27.90%	89	26	NL, JAL, TAMPS	3,565	0.00	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	



^aMillions of pesos. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. ROS – Rating Outlook Stable.
Source: Fitch Ratings.

Delinquencies 180+ Days by Transaction (% Over Outstanding Balance)



Cedevis transactions report on a bimonthly basis, therefore all information presented in this report concerning Cedevis deals are as of Jan. 31, 2010. These transactions are backed by loans originated by Infonavit. One characteristic of these mortgages is that payments are deducted directly from the borrower's paycheck. This feature virtually eliminates the borrowers' "willingness to pay" variable, which burdens other RMBS deals, even in spite of a tough economic environment. However, due to actual unemployment levels in México, Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions.

Delinquency levels presented in Cedevis transactions are not as high as the ones presented in other RMBS deals. After a period of stabilization, extensions have started to slightly decrease. It is important to state that though extensions under the Infonavit scheme are not considered delinquent loans, they do have an impact on the cash flows received by the trusts. The highest levels in extensions are more prominent in transactions issued during 2008, as these pools presented higher concentrations of borrowers from northern states.




As mentioned in the most recent RMBS Performance Update Report (*dated Sept. 18, 2009, available on Fitch's Web site at www.fitchratings.com*), given the nature of the Cedevis' collection reports, which do not differentiate between scheduled principal payments and principal prepayments, it is not possible to compute a standard CPR for the Cedevis. As a proxy, Fitch uses principal prepayment rates (PPR), which, unlike the CPR calculation, include all the principal payments received during a collection, whether it was scheduled or not. PPR must not be compared to CPR computed for the rest of Fitch's portfolio. The PPR levels for those bonds issued between 2007 and 2009 range from 4.09%–6.27%, while the levels for the rest of the portfolio, issued before 2007, equal 6.35%–8.86%. One exception would be CEDEVIS04, which had a PPR level of 18.74% as of Nov. 30, 2009.

FOVISSSTE

FOVISSSTE

Deal Name	Closing Information					Current Performance				
	Closing Date	Initial CE	WA OLTV (%)	WA Seasoning (Months)	Top Three States	Current Collateral Balance ^a	Delinquent (%)		Current Rating	
TFOVIS 09U	6/26/09	28.00%	82	38	EM, DF, JAL	4,387	0.81	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	
TFOVIS 092U	9/11/09	28.50%	82	38	EM, DF, MICH	4,694	0.69	0.07	AAA(mex) ROS	
TFOVIS093U	12/11/09	28.50%	77	38	EM, HID, DF	6,934	0.42	0.00	AAA(mex) ROS	


^aMillions of UDIs. ^bFull wrap applies to senior notes. Mex – Mexico. CE – Credit enhancement. OLTV – Original loan to value. WA – Weighted average. RWN – Rating Watch Negative. RON – Rating Outlook Negative.
Source: Fitch Ratings.



A total of three TFOVIS, FOVISSSTE’s RMBS product, were issued during 2009 in the local market as part of a MXP 20 billion program authorized by Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV). Mortgage payments in these transactions feature direct deductions from the borrowers’ payroll and therefore eliminate the willingness-to-pay variable. FOVISSSTE also collects 5% of the workers’ monthly wage as an employer’s contribution on a bimonthly basis.


At the cutoff date of June 30, 2009, the TFOVIS 09U transaction presented a significant decrease on current loans that migrated 1 to 30 days delinquencies. Corrections were made at the end of September, and this issue was presented again in December. According to the issuer, this was due to a delay on the transfers of two government entities (“dependencias”). The same situation arose in TFOVIS 092U during September, and it was fixed the following month. Volatility in early delinquency buckets could be attributed to operational procedures performed by the entities.

Constant Prepayment Rate



Source: Fitch Ratings.


Delinquencies 180+ Days by Transaction (% Over Original Balance)




Source: Fitch Ratings.

Appendix


Delinquencies 90+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) SOFOLES issued 2004, 2005, and 2006




Delinquencies 90+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) SOFOLES issued 2007 and 2008




Delinquencies 90+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) Banks




Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) SOFOLES Issued 2004 and 2008 (Green) versus 2007 (Red)



Delinquencies 180+ Days (% Over Outstanding Balance) Peso (Green) versus UDI (Red)



Delinquencies 180+ Days by Transaction (% Over Original Balance)



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